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THE POLLUTER PAYS PRINCIPLE IN EUROPEAN




Environmental protection is firmly established as a central objective in the
regulation of European agriculture.  This is illustrated by the fact that in July
2002, when the European Commission laid down the aims of the Mid-term
Review of the Common Agricultural Policy, one of these aims was “production
methods that support environmentally friendly, quality products that the public
wants.”1  Such emphasis on environmental protection reflects growing public
concerns regarding the “negative externalities” generated by intensive farming.
For example, agriculture is now the major source of nitrate in European Union
waters.2  The European Community institutions readily acknowledge the extent
to which these public concerns inform agricultural policy.  In surveys
undertaken by the European Commission, the promotion of respect for the
environment features consistently high as a role of the Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP); indeed, it ranks second only to food safety.3
Moreover, a key driver behind the Agenda 2000 reforms of the CAP and
their Mid-term Review has been the imperative of securing greater public
acceptability for the multifunctional “European Model of Agriculture.”4  This
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NEW CENTURY 2 (2001), available at http://www.usda.gov/news/pubs/farmpolicy01/fpindex.
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8. Council Directive 91/676, pmbl., 1991 O.J. (L 375) 1, 2 [hereinafter Nitrates Directive].
model is characterised by its ability to generate both food outputs and non-food
outputs, and the conservation of a distinctive rural landscape has featured large
among non-food outputs.  Accordingly, early in the reform process, the
European Commission spoke of the “bad image of the CAP in the minds of the
public”;5 and this bad image was, to a considerable degree, predicated upon the
adverse impact of intensive farming upon natural resources:
[a]n agriculture which pollutes, which contributes inadequately to
spatial development and protection of the environment . . . has no
chance of long-term survival and cannot justify what it is costing.
Making the CAP more acceptable to the citizen in the street, to the
consumer, is one of our primary tasks in the years ahead.6
One should not, however, perceive such sentiments as confined to the European
Community.  They are echoed, not least, in the United States.  Thus, in Food
and Agricultural Policy: Taking Stock for the New Century it was
unequivocally stated that “Americans consider environmental quality as a kind
of ‘non-market’ good that is extremely important in consumer choices.”7  It
may also be noted that the European Community institutions have considered
environmental protection as a fit forum for European Community action.
Pollution and other forms of environmental degradation have the capacity to
cross national frontiers, and, accordingly, much may be gained in regulating at
European Community level rather than at the level of the Member State.
Council Directive 91/676 (Nitrates Directive) itself recited that “since pollution
of water due to nitrates on one Member State can influence waters in other
Member States, action at Community level . . . is therefore necessary.”8 
In this context, the polluter pays principle has already played a leading role.
It is currently enshrined in Article 174(2) of the Treaty Establishing the
European Community (EC Treaty), which provides:
Community policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of
protection taking into account the diversity of situations in the
various regions of the Community.  It shall be based on the
precautionary principle and on the principles that preventive action
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174-176).  For a thorough analysis of the principles underlying European Community
environmental law see, for example, NICOLAS DE SADELEER, ENVIRONMENTAL PRINCIPLES:
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GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE (2000).
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should be taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be
rectified at source and that the polluter should pay.9
All four principles also enjoy specific mention in the Sixth Community
Environment Action Programme, which covers the period until July 2012.10
That said, given its contemporary importance, it is perhaps surprising that the
word “environment” did not appear in the treaty provisions as originally
enacted in 1957.  Indeed, the environmental protection requirements were not
formally incorporated until amendment by the Single European Act, which
came into force in 1987.11  On the other hand, both the legislature and the
European Court of Justice had showed considerable ingenuity in expanding
European Community competence into the environmental arena long before
any formal treaty provision.  In particular, the European Court of Justice had
placed a liberal interpretation upon Article 100, which granted the European
Community competence to enact “harmonising” measures, which directly
affected the establishment or functioning of the common market.12  Although
first employed in the field of product harmonisation, this Article subsequently
served as authority for measures directed to ensuring a “level playing field”
between Member States with respect to the environment.  Otherwise, to the
extent that one Member State imposed heavier environmental protection
requirements than another, there was potential for distortion of competition.13
The polluter pays principle as applied to agriculture may be addressed with
specific reference to two areas: first, liability for nitrate pollution, and, second,
the imposition of environmental protection requirements upon farmers as a
condition for receipt of direct payments, known as “cross compliance.”  Before
addressing these specific issues, however, it may be noted as a preliminary
point that the agriculture sector has proved fertile ground for exploration of the
distinction between (a) the operation of the polluter pays principle and (b) the
right to compensation for efforts over and above a baseline to be determined,
or the “provider gets principle.”  In essence, farmers should generally be
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regarded as liable for pollution and other “negative externalities” below the
standard of good agricultural practice, but as entitled to payment for the
provision of “public goods” where they exceed that standard.  This distinction
has found clear expression in policy documents, such as Directions Towards
Sustainable Agriculture:
Making the CAP more acceptable to the citizen in the street, to the
consumer, is one of our primary tasks in the years ahead.  The
various roles performed by farmers, in particular in maintaining and
conserving the countryside, are increasingly under close scrutiny by
society.  On the one hand farmers must reach the minimum standard
of environmental care demanded by society including observance of
compulsory legislation; on the other hand, if society wants farmers
to provide environmental services beyond the basic level of good
agricultural practice, they should be paid for their costs and income
losses in delivering these public benefits.14
More recently, the European Commission expressly stated that “in application
of the Polluter Pays Principle, a farmer may not normally be paid to conform
with environmental legislation in place.”15
Nevertheless, as policy instruments develop, it may become increasingly
difficult to preserve a bright-line distinction between the polluter pays principle
and the provider gets principle.  As this article will discuss in greater detail,
cross compliance would not appear capable of characterisation as a clear
expression of either principle.  Any ensuing legal difficulties are magnified by
the fact that in the European Community such obligations have now been
extended to the vast majority of direct payments to farmers.16
Accordingly, Part II of this article will discuss the liability that  farmers face
for nitrate pollution, including legislation enacted by both the European
Community and the United Kingdom. Part III will discuss cross compliance,
which, as indicated, involves the conditioning of payments to farmers upon
their observance of environmental protection and other measures.  This section
commences with an examination of early initiatives and then directs its focus
to the very considerable expansion of cross compliance under Mid-term
Review.  Part IV highlights aspects of the ongoing strategy to implement the
polluter pays principle within the European Community.  It then analyzes the
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extent to which European Community regulation of agriculture applies the
polluter pays principle and/or the provider gets principle.  In this analysis
particular attention is paid to the difficulties which are encountered when
seeking to categorise cross compliance.
II. Liability for Nitrate Pollution
A. European Community Legislation
Agriculture’s status as the major source of nitrate in rivers and aquifers in
Western Europe17 came about due to heavy application of nitrogenous fertilisers
by European Community farmers.  For example, in 2000, the average use of
such fertilisers reached 34 tonnes per square mile in Germany and the United
Kingdom, as opposed to 7.6 tonnes per square mile in the United States.18
Scientists generally agree that high concentrations of nitrate have a
deleterious effect both on drinking water quality and on the aquatic
environment.19  In the latter case, there is danger of eutrophication, where
nutrient enrichment leads to “algal blooms.”20  These, for example, impact
adversely on recreational use of waters and reduce oxygen levels below those
required by certain aquatic life.21  To address declining standards in drinking
water, the European Community enacted Council Directive 75/440, concerning
the quality of surface water intended for the abstraction of drinking water,22 and
Council Directive 80/778, relating to the quality of water intended for human
consumption.23  These Directives, inter alia, limited the maximum nitrate
content to fifty milligrams per litre.24  Then, in 1991, the European Community
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enacted the Nitrates Directive.25  Although confined to nitrate pollution, it was
targeted to control of farming practice, nitrate from agriculture being already
identified as “the main cause of pollution from diffuse sources affecting the
Community’s waters.”26  In particular, by 20 December 1993 Member States
were to identify and then designate nitrate vulnerable zones;27 and by the same
date they were to establish action programmes in respect of these zones with the
twin objectives of reducing water pollution caused or induced by nitrate from
agricultural sources and preventing further such pollution.28  For these purposes,
it was not sufficient to identify only waters intended for the abstraction of
drinking water.29  Rather, as made very clear by the European Court of Justice
in European Commission v. United Kingdom,30 the Nitrates Directive obliged
Member States to identify all surface freshwaters and groundwaters which have
or could have a nitrate concentration in excess of fifty milligrams per litre, and
then to designate nitrate vulnerable zones for their protection.31  In addition,
there was an obligation to establish a code or codes of good agricultural
practice.32
B. United Kingdom Legislation
1. The Pilot Nitrate Scheme and Nitrate Sensitive Areas
The manner in which the United Kingdom has implemented European
Community legislation to address nitrate pollution has shed interesting light on
the operation of the polluter pays principle.  The initial measure, the Pilot
Nitrate Scheme, predated the Nitrates Directive.33  This Scheme was carried into
effect under the statutory authority of Section 112 of the Water Act 1989,34 and
the implementing secondary legislation in England was the Nitrate Sensitive
Areas (Designation) Order 1990.35  Although Section 112 of the Water Act
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1989 also conferred  authority for mandatory restrictions, with or without
compensation,36 the method of implementation chosen was both voluntary and
compensatory.  A “basic scheme” and a “premium scheme” were made
available, the latter extending to obligations to convert arable land into low
intensity grassland.  In total, ten pilot areas were designated, and the level of
take-up was very high, some 87% of agricultural land within the pilot areas
becoming subject to Nitrate Sensitive Area agreements.37
In light of the success of the Pilot Nitrate Scheme, the scope of control was
materially expanded in 1994 by the Nitrate Sensitive Areas Regulations 1994,
applicable in England.38  The statutory authority to designate nitrate sensitive
areas was, by that date, conferred by Sections 94-95 of the Water Resources Act
1991, which replaced, with amendment, Section 112 of the Water Act 1989.39
Significantly, however, this Scheme complied with, in terms of European
Community legislation, not the Nitrates Directive but Council Regulation
2078/1992 (Agri-environment Regulation).40  The Agri-environment Regulation
focused attention on payment to farmers in return for effort beyond a baseline,
whereas, as shall be seen, in the case of nitrate vulnerable zones under the
Nitrates Directive, the polluter pays principle has been allowed to take full
effect.  Indeed, the Preamble to the Agri-environment Regulation expressly
stated that “the measures must compensate farmers for any income losses
caused by reductions in output and/or increases in costs and for the part they
play in improving the environment.”41  Pronouncements by the United
Kingdom Government also made this distinction explicit.  For example, in a
Written Answer on 23 July 1996, the Minister for Rural Affairs declared that,
since nitrate vulnerable zones would be “based on good agricultural practice,
the question of compensation does not arise”; whereas, in the case of nitrate
sensitive areas, “farmers undertake voluntarily to make substantial changes to
their farming practices, going significantly beyond good agricultural practice,
in return for compensation.”42
In total, twenty-two nitrate sensitive areas were designated,43 and to these
were added those in the Pilot Nitrate Scheme on June 1, 1996.44  Again there
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was a very high level of take-up, with concluded agreements covering 19,600
hectares by April 1996, excluding land still in the Pilot Nitrate Scheme.45
2. Nitrate Vulnerable Zones
Accordingly, it was only the third tranche of legislation, the Protection of
Water Against Agricultural Nitrate Pollution (England and Wales) Regulations
1996, which carried into effect both the identification and designation of nitrate
vulnerable zones under the Nitrates Directive.46  In addition to these two
functions, the same Regulations laid down procedures for the establishment of
action programmes and provided that the relevant paragraphs of the Code of
Good Agricultural Practice for the Protection of Water should operate as the
code of good agricultural practice for the purposes of the Nitrates Directive.47
In principle, for the purposes of the Nitrates Directive, farmers should
implement any code of good agricultural practice on a voluntary basis.48
Importantly, however, it was later decided to base the action programme on the
relevant paragraphs of the Code of Good Agricultural Practice for the
Protection of Water, thus, effectively, rendering these paragraphs compul-
sory.49
Initially, sixty-eight nitrate vulnerable zones were designated in England and
Wales, covering approximately 600,000 hectares;50 and, in the case of England,
this amounted to 8% of the land area.51  Nonetheless, as has been seen,
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following the judgment of the European Court of Justice in European
Commission v. United Kingdom it proved necessary to identify all surface
freshwaters and groundwaters which have or could have a nitrate concentration
in excess of fifty milligrams per litre, and then to designate nitrate vulnerable
zones for their protection.52  For the purpose of complying with this judgment,
the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA)
countenanced two alternative strategies: either applying the action programme
to all of England; or applying the action programme within specific designated
nitrate vulnerable zones, it being estimated that these would cover
approximately 80% of England.53  The former alternative was adopted in
Austria, Denmark, Germany, Finland, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, and
enjoyed such advantages as, inter alia, simplicity and equal treatment among
farmers.54  The latter alternative was not only more widely adopted among
Member States, but also ensured greater targeting and, overall, lower
compliance costs.55  Following consultation, the latter alternative was preferred,
but the estimate of 80% coverage proved high.  Only a further 47% of the land
area of England was designated.56  Combined with the 8% already designated,
the total proportion comprised in nitrate vulnerable zones came to 55%.57
Significantly, compensation has never been provided under the United
Kingdom legislation implementing nitrate vulnerable zones.  This is fully
consistent with the polluter pays principle.  As has been seen, a contrast may
therefore be drawn with nitrate sensitive areas, where the provider gets
principle would seem to apply.58  That said, it is not always evident that the
obligations in nitrate sensitive areas necessarily mark a “step-change” in
severity as opposed to those in nitrate vulnerable zones.59  The maximum
allowable levels of organic nitrogen fertiliser illustrate this point.  Under the
Nitrate Sensitive Areas Regulations 1994 it is  stipulated that, in the case of
nitrate sensitive areas, a farmer could not in any twelve month period “apply
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Regulation].  This Regulation will be replaced for the programming period which commences
organic nitrogen fertiliser in excess of the quantity which would result in the
application to the land of 250 kilograms of nitrogen per hectare.”60  Yet, in the
case of nitrate vulnerable zones, the Code of Good Agricultural Practice for the
Protection of Water goes so far as to require that farmers should “not apply
more than 250 kg/ha of total nitrogen in organic manure in any 12 months.”61
On the other hand, in the case of nitrate sensitive areas, the “premium scheme”
does provide the option of far more onerous undertakings; and the example may
be reiterated of converting arable land into low intensity grassland.
Nonetheless, the Court of Auditors has not been slow to criticise the extent to
which Member States have compensated farmers for relatively light extra effort.
In their view, “[a]id should only be given if the farmer’s commitments go
beyond levels marked by the Nitrate Directive and good farming practice.”62
In 2002, DEFRA estimated the costs to the English farming industry of
complying with the action programme to be approximately £20 million per
annum.63  That said, the economic impact of the Nitrates Directive has been
mitigated by the availability of grants to assist with the disposal of farm waste.
Under the initial Regulations enacted for this purpose, the Farm Waste Grant
(Nitrate Vulnerable Zones) (England and Wales) Scheme 1996, it was possible
to claim capital grants to cover 25% of expenditure incurred in respect of
specified works, these including the provision, replacement, or improvement of
facilities for the handling and storage of manure, slurry, and silage effluent.64
The aggregate amount of any qualifying expenditure was not to exceed
£85,000.65  The authority in European Community law for these Regulations
was not the Nitrates Directive, but Council Regulation 2328/91, directed to
improving the efficiency of agricultural structures.66  Accordingly, by looking
outside the Nitrates Directive, where no compensation is payable, the United
Kingdom Government secured a level of support towards meeting the increased
legislative burden.  The current Regulations for England are the Farm Waste
Grant (Nitrate Vulnerable Zones) (England) Scheme 2003, under which the rate
of grant has been raised to 40%.67  The current authority in European
Community law is Council Regulation 1257/1999 (Rural Development
Regulation).68  It may be highlighted that, with the Rural Development
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Regulation focusing on the provision of remuneration for farmers in respect of
extra effort, again the provider gets principle, not the polluter pays principle,
would seem to apply.69
Notwithstanding this 1996 legislative package, United Kingdom farmers in
Regina v. Secretary of State for the Environment ex parte Standley70 challenged
the validity of national implementation of the Nitrates Directive, on the basis
that nitrate vulnerable zones were only to be designated if the threshold of fifty
milligrams per litre would be exceeded by reason of discharge from
agricultural sources alone.71  In other words, the farmers argued that the
measures took insufficient account of non-agricultural sources.  The counter-
arguments were that it was sufficient to trigger designation if agricultural
sources made a significant contribution to nitrate levels; that there was no
requirement to establish levels solely attributable to agricultural sources; and
that, in any event, precise attribution as between agricultural and non-
agricultural sources was impossible.72
In the alternative, the farmers argued that, if the interpretation of the Nitrates
Directive adopted by the United Kingdom authorities was correct, then the
Nitrates Directive itself was invalid, on the basis that it infringed the polluter
pays principle, the principle of rectifying environmental damage at source, the
principle of proportionality, and the right to property.73
The European Court of Justice held that Member States were not required to
determine precisely what proportion of nitrate pollution came from agricultural
sources; nor was it necessary that the cause of such pollution be exclusively
agricultural.74  Rather, it was sufficient if the discharge of nitrate of agricultural
origin made a significant contribution to the overall concentration; and, with
Member States being afforded a wide discretion in implementing the Nitrates
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Directive, European Community law could not lay down precise criteria for
establishing whether there was a significant contribution in each case.75
With regard to the validity of the Nitrates Directive itself, the European
Court of Justice held that the legislation contained sufficient flexibility to
prevent any breach of the principle of proportionality.76  For example, action
programmes were to address the characteristics of nitrate vulnerable zones, such
as soil conditions, soil type, climatic conditions, and rainfall.77  More
specifically with regard to the polluter pays principle, this was considered to be
closely related to the principle of proportionality.78  The Nitrates Directive
required Member States to take account of sources of nitrate pollution other
than agriculture, and did not require farmers to bear the burden of dealing with
nitrate pollution to which they had not contributed.79  Accordingly, this
principle too was not infringed.  Like considerations applied in the case of the
principle of rectifying environmental damage at source.80  Finally, it was held
that the right to property was also respected.81  As consistently asserted by the
European Court of Justice, this right is not absolute, but “must be viewed in
relation to its social function.”82  In consequence, it could be restricted to meet
an objective of general interest pursued by the European Community, provided
that the restrictions did not “constitute a disproportionate and intolerable
interference,” impairing its very substance.83  In this case, the restrictions related
to the protection of public health, an objective of general interest, and in a
manner which did not impair the very substance of the right.84  Such an
approach finds distinct echoes in the United States, where statutory provisions
to establish and maintain prescribed soil and water conservation practices have
been held constitutional.85
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III. Cross Compliance
A. Early Developments
For some time, the European Community has sought to promote the
protection of the environment by attaching conditions to direct payments to
farmers.  Early examples of this practice may be found in the context of
structural legislation (which would become, with emphasis on rural
development, the “Second Pillar” of the CAP), as opposed to legislation
governing the common organisations of the market (the “First Pillar” of the
CAP).86  Thus, when in 1988 the structural legislation introduced the possibility
to “set aside” or “idle” land, Member States were given the option to “make it
an obligation for the beneficiary to maintain the set-aside land in order to
protect the environment and natural resources.”87  Further amendment to the
structural legislation in 1989 provided that environmental conditions could be
attached to the payment of compensatory allowances to farmers in mountain,
hill, or less-favoured areas.88  The United Kingdom exercised this discretion to
attach penalties for overgrazing and, subsequently, for the use of unsuitable
supplementary feeding methods.89
More significantly, the 1992 MacSharry reforms, and legislation enacted
shortly thereafter, extended such cross compliance to direct payments made to
farmers under the common organisations of the market.  This significance flows
from the fact that differing principles would seem to have applied in respect of
payments under the structural legislation and in respect of payments under the
common organisations of the market.  In the case of the structural legislation,
the provider gets principle generally held sway.  Accordingly, the conditions
were imposed upon the receipt of remuneration for the delivery of “positive
externalities,” such as the maintenance of farming in hill areas.90  On the other
hand, as shall be seen, when extending cross compliance to the legislation
governing the common organisations of the market, the conditions created a
hurdle to be cleared before entitlement to more general price or producer
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support could be unlocked.  Thus, the conditions were more broadly directed
to addressing the “negative externalities” generated by intensive farming.
In particular, the 1992 MacSharry reforms saw the “greening” of support in
the livestock sector.  Most notably, headage payments in the form of suckler
cow premium and beef special premium were placed subject to a stocking
density limit.91  This limit was initially fixed at 3.5 livestock units per forage
hectare for the 1993 calendar year.92  It was then racheted down to two livestock
units per forage hectare for the 1996 and following calendar years.93  That said,
in Member States where extensive beef production was the norm, even a
stocking density limit of two livestock units per forage hectare was not
burdensome.  By way of illustration, in 1995 an empirical survey of 389 United
Kingdom beef farmers found that the provisions affected only 9.6% of the
sample.94  However, in Member States where beef production was more
intensive, the impact was more severe.  An empirical survey of 101 Danish beef
farmers in the same year found that 37.6% had been affected.95  This might be
regarded as successful targeting of the areas of greatest environmental concern;
but specific rules did without doubt dilute the effectiveness of the provisions.
Significantly, not all animals were included in the calculation of the stocking
density, pigs being but one example, and producers with not more than fifteen
livestock units were exempt.96
This element of compulsion in the livestock sector was replicated also in the
cereals sector.  Thus, whereas set-aside had formerly been a voluntary scheme
authorised by the structural legislation, under the 1992 MacSharry reforms it
became a compulsory element of the common organisation of the market in
cereals, with environmental protection as a firm objective.  Indeed, Article 7(3)
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of Council Regulation 1765/92 stipulated as an obligatory requirement that
“Member States shall apply appropriate environmental measures which
correspond to the specific situation of the land set aside.”97  This removed any
element of discretion previously enjoyed by the Member States.
Further legislation enacted shortly after the 1992 MacSharry reforms saw
Member States authorised to attach environmental conditions to headage
payments made under the common organisations of the market in the livestock
sector.98  The application of the polluter pays principle was evident in the
requirement that, where Member States introduced such cross compliance,
penalties for breach were mandatory.  For example, in the context of sheep and
goat annual premium, it was stipulated that:
Member States which avail themselves of this possibility shall
impose penalties appropriate to and commensurate with the
seriousness of the ecological consequences of any breach of these
measures.  Such penalties may provide for the reduction or, where
necessary, the abolition of the benefits linked to the respective
premium schemes.99
Only two Member States, including the United Kingdom, implemented this
form of cross compliance.100  Penalties were introduced for both overgrazing
and the use of unsuitable supplementary feeding methods, which could extend
to withholding or recovering on demand the whole of any premium payable or
already paid for the marketing year in question.101
As a result, early measures attaching cross compliance conditions to direct
payments under the common organisations of the market would not seem to
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2006
104 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  59:89
102. 1999 O.J. (L 160 ) 113 [hereinafter 1999 Horizontal Regulation].
103. Id. art. 3(1), at 114.
104. Id.
105. Id. pmbl. (3), at 113.
106. Id. art. 3(2), at 114.
have had major effect.  Where compulsory, as in the case of the stocking
density limit or set-aside, they did not as a rule constitute an onerous burden;
and, where there was capacity to exert greater influence on farming practices,
as in the case of headage payments, implementation was at the option of the
Member State. 
B. The Agenda 2000 Reforms: The Berlin Summit
Such deficiencies were, to a degree, addressed by the Agenda 2000 reforms
as agreed at the Berlin Summit of March 1999.  In particular, Council
Regulation 1259/1999 (1999 Horizontal Regulation),102 which applied to most
direct payments to farmers under the common organisations of the market,
obliged Member States to “take the environmental measures they consider to
be appropriate in view of the situation of the agricultural land used or the
production concerned and which reflect the potential environmental effects.”103
These measures could include “support in return for agri-environmental
commitments,” “general mandatory environmental requirements,” or “specific
environmental requirements constituting a condition for direct payments.”104
The first-mentioned corresponded most naturally with payments for extra effort
on a voluntary basis, which one would expect to find under the“Second Pillar”
of the CAP, as newly constituted by the Rural Development Regulation.
Besides, the Preamble to the 1999 Horizontal Regulation expressly recited that
the environmental measures which it required “should be taken by Member
States notwithstanding the possibility of granting aid in return for optional agri-
environmental commitments.”105  The other two measures, by contrast, could
be more accurately characterised as imposing cross compliance obligations, and
as comprising part of an obligatory framework for environmental protection.
Again, Member States were to impose penalties “appropriate and proportionate
to the seriousness of the ecological consequences” of non-compliance, and,
again, these could extend to the “cancellation of the benefits accruing from the
support schemes concerned.”106
In this context, two factors combined to reduce the efficacy of 1999
Horizontal Regulation.  First, the cross compliance conditions were confined
to environmental protection.  Second, although the environmental protection
requirements were mandatory, the manner of their implementation afforded a
broad level of discretion to Member States, creating a real danger of distortion
in competition.  The Committee of the Regions expressly recognized this in its
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Opinion on the draft legislation.107  In consequence, the Committee advocated
that “framework rules should be set in place” at European Community level.108
The Committee also advocated that, in the case of direct payments under the
common organisations of the market, the baseline for cross compliance
conditions should be good farming practice, with separate payments “made for
the provision of additional environmental services.”109
C. The Mid-term Review
The opportunity to reinforce cross compliance was taken up at the time of the
Mid-term Review, regarded by the European Community institutions as
constituting a “sea-change” in policy development.110  Thus, when the reforms
were agreed on 26 June 2003, Commissioner Fischler declared that “[t]oday
marks the beginning of a new era.”111  The main policy initiative may have been
the rolling up of most direct payments into the single farm payment (SFP),
decoupled from production; but a further major initiative was the attachment to
not just the SFP but also the vast majority of direct payments of a broad menu
of compulsory cross compliance conditions.112  This had the capacity to limit
substantially the “negative externalities” of farming, and, indeed, Commissioner
Fischler saw “a return to sustainability” as a primary goal of the reforms.113
As indicated, the Mid-term Review extended cross compliance well beyond
environmental protection.  The 2003 Horizontal Regulation provides that, as a
general rule, the receipt of any direct payment is subject to, first, “statutory
management requirements,” and, second, an obligation to maintain all
agricultural land “in good agricultural and environmental condition.”114  The
former relate to: public, animal, and plant health; the environment; and animal
welfare.115  In total, specified provisions of eighteen European Community
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Regulations and Directives must be observed.  These are listed in Annex III to
the 2003 Horizontal Regulation, and include Articles 4 and 5 of the Nitrates
Directive.116  The draft legislation had proposed cross compliance with specified
provisions of thirty-eight Regulations and Directives, with immediate effect.117
Yet, as noted, the reforms as finally agreed reduced this number to eighteen;
and, besides, their observance is to be implemented in three annual tranches,
commencing on 1 January 2005.118
In addition, Annex IV to the 2003 Horizontal Regulation sets out a European
Community framework for “good agricultural and environmental condition,”
which takes “into account the specific characteristics of the areas concerned,
including soil and climatic condition, existing farming systems, land use, crop
rotation, farming practices, and farm structures.”119  Although Member States
enjoy discretion within this framework, the potential for distortion of
competition seems to have been reduced.  That said, on implementation by the
devolved administrations within the United Kingdom, the opportunity was
taken to impose slightly different rules as to what amounts to “good agricultural
and environmental condition.”120
Importantly, the European Community framework is expressed to be
“without prejudice to the standards governing good agricultural practices”
under the Rural Development Regulation and “to agri-environment measures
applied above the reference level of good agricultural practices.”121  In
consequence, the distinction has been preserved between, on the one hand,
actions to be taken by farmers as a condition for the receipt of the SFP and most
direct payments under the common organisations of the market, and, on the
other hand, actions that would justify remuneration for the provision of “public
goods.”  The baseline seems to be good agricultural practice.  Thus, in order for
farmers to claim payment for agri-environmental and animal welfare
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol59/iss1/3
2006] THE PPP IMPACT ON UNITED KINGDOM FARMERS 107
122. Rural Development Regulation, supra note 68, art. 23(2), amended by Council
Regulation 1783/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 270) 70.
123. Council Regulation 1698/2005, 2005 O.J. (L 277) 1.
124. Id. art. 39(3), at 20.  Similar provisions will apply in the case of animal welfare
payments.  Id. art. 40(2), at 20.
125. 2003 Horizontal Regulation, supra note 16, art. 7(3), at 9.
126. See, e.g., Rather Cross Compliance, FARM LAW, June 2004, at 1, 3.




commitments under the Rural Development Regulation, those commitments
must “involve more than the application of usual good farming practice
including good animal husbandry practice.”122  This distinction will be further
preserved and, moreover, made more explicit when the Rural Development
Regulation is replaced by Council Regulation 1698/2005 for the programming
period which commences on January 1, 2007.123  Article 39(3) stipulates that
agri-environment payments should “cover only those commitments” which go
beyond the statutory management requirements and the obligation to maintain
all agricultural land in good agricultural and environmental condition, “as well
as minimum requirements for fertiliser and plant protection product use and
other relevant mandatory requirements established by national legislation and
identified in the programme.”124
Under the 2003 Horizontal Regulation, substantial penalties back up such
cross compliance, whether in relation to the statutory  management
requirements or the obligation to maintain all agricultural land in good
agricultural and environmental condition.  In an extreme case, where non-
compliance is intentional, the farmer can be excluded “from one or several aid
schemes . . . for one or more calendar years.”125
In this context, three matters of broader application may be considered.
First, the rationale behind enhancing cross compliance was articulated very
much in terms of increasing the public acceptability of farm support, but it is far
from certain that the public will in fact reap any dividend.126  In particular, the
statutory management requirements represent pre-existing rules with which
farmers should comply in any event.  Besides, the United Kingdom Secretary
of State for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs swiftly emphasised that cross
compliance will not be a heavy burden on farmers, while at the same time
divining advantages for the wider populace.127  Thus, in her Written Ministerial
Statement of 22 July 2004 she declared that the measures amounted to “a
relatively light requirement, representing a mixture of common-sense farming
practice and support for existing legislation, which should help drive an
improvement in overall performance and deliver public benefit.”128  A similar
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conclusion was reached in a 2004 report commissioned by DEFRA to consider
the likely impacts of the Mid-term Review on diffuse water pollution from
agriculture.  This report stated that, “[g]iven pressure to keep cross-compliance
conditions to a minimum and agri-environment schemes not being attractive to
all farmers, the success of such measures in responding to [diffuse water
pollution from agriculture] must be viewed with some degree of caution.”129
Nevertheless, the penalties for non-compliance, which may extend to total
loss of direct payments for one or more calendar years, are additional to any
penalties to be enforced under the various Directives and Regulations which
together constitute the statutory management requirements.130  As recited in the
2003 Horizontal Regulation, such withdrawal of direct payments “should be
without prejudice to sanctions laid down now or in the future under other
provisions of Community or national law.”131  It has even been suggested that
this may amount to “double jeopardy.”132  Further, although the statutory
management requirements may represent pre-existing rules, the obligation to
maintain all land in good agricultural and environmental condition is without
doubt new.  Some of the detailed criteria set out in the European Community
framework admittedly do not amount to novel practice.  These include for
example, “[a]ppropriate machinery use,” and “[a]voiding the encroachment of
unwanted vegetation on agricultural land.”133  However, to reflect the fact that
receipt of the SFP and most direct payments is not dependent upon production
as such, the coverage of the obligation is unusually broad, in that it applies also
to land that is not in production, so as to prevent land abandonment.134  By way
of illustration, the implementing legislation in England specifically requires
that, as a general rule, farmers must periodically “cut down any scrub and cut
down or graze any rank vegetation” on land which is not in agricultural
production.135
Second, as with nitrate sensitive areas and nitrate vulnerable zones, it is not
always easy to detect the boundary between management obligations which are
conditions for receipt of the SFP and most direct payments and management
obligations which attract remuneration for their delivery of “public goods.”
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Thus, in England, there is considerable similarity between the management
obligations required for maintenance of the land in good agricultural and
environmental condition — which, as has been seen, are regarded as cross
compliance — and the management obligations that are regarded as sufficient
to attract specific remuneration under the Entry Level of the Environmental
Stewardship (England) Regulations 2005.136  Indeed, in emphasising the merits
of the Environmental Stewardship Scheme, the United Kingdom Secretary of
State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs highlighted this overlap:
In addition, farmers will be able to receive payment under ELS
[Entry Level Stewardship] for positive management of their hedges,
as well as for establishing and managing a range of buffer strip
options next to the cross-compliance protection zone around hedges
and ditches.  Since one of the qualifying conditions for the
hedgerow management options in ELS will be that farmers leave a
minimum uncultivated strip, those farmers entering hedges into ELS
will largely be meeting their cross-compliance requirements in this
respect.137
Third, it is also not immediately evident that the cross compliance conditions
attached to the SFP and most direct payments amount to a straightforward
application of the polluter pays principle.  Strictly speaking, a farmer could
forego the payments and be free of the conditions.  Yet realistically, the
magnitude of the payments leaves little independent choice.  On one calculation
for 2005-2006, the SFP, net of cross compliance costs, will contribute £66 per
acre, as against overall farm profit of £62 per acre.138  In consequence, cross
compliance may arguably be characterised as a bargain, but one where the
farmer has little room for manoeuvre in negotiations.139  This legal analysis sits
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well with a key objective of the Mid-term Review, that there should be
“justification of support through the provision of services that the public
expects farmers to provide.”140  Likewise, as has been seen, the United
Kingdom Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
specifically understood cross compliance to deliver public benefit,141 and
Commissioner Fischler welcomed any shift away from the perception that
farmers are objects of charity.  Not least, he declared that the Mid-term Review
had the effect of “reconciling agricultural policy with social expectations and
clearly establishing the rewards for additional services, thereby justifying
budget outlay.”142  However, as has also been seen, doubts may arise as to
whether the form of cross compliance implemented does deliver additional
services.  The farmer must observe conditions up to a baseline of good
agricultural practice, but no requirement mandates that the farmer exceed this
baseline.
Further, it is also not immediately evident that such cross compliance
amounts to a straightforward application of the provider gets principle.  No
baseline is to be exceeded in order to attract payment, and, moreover, it may be
questioned whether even a major function of the SFP is the delivery of “public
goods.”  Although that function may receive emphasis in policy documents, the
2003 Horizontal Regulation unequivocally describes the new form of subsidy
as “income support.”143
IV. Conclusion
Both the measures relating to nitrate pollution and those introducing and
extending cross compliance are but part of an ongoing programme.  Two
current initiatives warrant mention.  First, Directive 2000/60 of the European
Parliament and of the Council (Water Framework Directive) will phase in a
river basin approach to water management, which has obvious implications for
agriculture as the primary form of land use.144  Notably, this Directive requires
that “Member States shall take account of the principle of recovery of the costs
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of water services, including environmental and resource costs”; and this
requirement is expressly stated to be “in accordance in particular with the
polluter pays principle.”145  The new legislation will not, however, affect the
Nitrates Directive.  Second, Directive 2004/35 of the European Parliament and
of the Council (Environmental Liability Directive) will establish a European
Community liability regime directed to the prevention and remedying of
environmental damage,146 and the Preamble expressly recites that
implementation should be achieved “through the furtherance of the ‘polluter
pays’ principle”:
The fundamental principle of this Directive should therefore be that
an operator whose activity has caused the environmental damage or
the imminent threat of such damage is to be held financially liable,
in order to induce operators to adopt measures and develop practices
to minimise the risks of environmental damage so that their
exposure to financial liabilities is reduced.147
These initiatives confirm that farmers are widely understood to be a source of
“negative externalities.”  They also confirm that the policy response is
increasingly to apply the polluter pays principle.
Nonetheless, as has been highlighted, in the agricultural context it is not
always easy to determine the extent to which the polluter pays principle does
indeed apply.  In some cases its application would seem relatively clear.  In this
category would fall, for example, nitrate vulnerable zones under the Nitrates
Directive, where restrictions are imposed without compensation and
participation is compulsory.148  In other cases, by contrast, the underlying
principle would seem to be that the provider gets rather than that the polluter
pays.  In this second category would fall, for example, agri-environmental
schemes under the Rural Development Regulation.  Farmers are again subject
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to restrictions, but these are voluntary.  They also exceed the reference level of
good farming practice and, as a result, produce the “public goods” which justify
the remuneration.149
A third and more difficult category is that exemplified by cross compliance
and, in particular, the cross compliance conditions attached to the SFP and most
direct payments under the 2003 Horizontal Regulation.  In this category, neither
the polluter pays principle nor the provider gets principle seems strictly
applicable.  Payment of support depends upon the observation of the statutory
management requirements and the obligation to maintain all agricultural land
in good agricultural and environmental condition.150  However, the 2003
Horizontal Regulation itself concedes that these are “basic standards.”151
Accordingly, on the one hand, they can be distinguished from the higher
standards necessary to trigger the provider gets principle under the Rural
Development Regulation: as noted, under that Regulation it is expressly
provided that “[a]gri-environmental and animal welfare commitments shall
involve more than the application of usual good farming practice including
good animal husbandry practice.”152  On the other hand, there is not evident the
degree of compulsion necessary for the application of the polluter pays
principle.  Undeniably, failure to observe the cross compliance conditions may
lead to loss of the support that is so essential to financial viability.  Yet, as a
matter of law, farmers do have the theoretical option of dispensing with the SFP
and other direct payments and, with them, any cross compliance under the 2003
Horizontal Regulation.153
As suggested, a possible legal analysis is that the imposition on support of
environmental and other “multifunctional” conditions forms part of a bargain
between the farmer and society.  But, for the reasons considered, any such
bargain is imperfect.  On the one side, the farmer has little choice but to accept
the SFP and other direct payments, together with their cross compliance
conditions.  The financial imperative of support represents a powerful lever.  On
the other side, from the point of view of society, it may again be questioned
whether any substantial dividend is being secured over and above existing
obligations.  Besides, more generally, there is room for debate whether society
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should be expected to bargain with farmers for compliance with good farming
practice.154
What can be said with some certainty is that these difficulties of analysis are
a function of the “greening” of agriculture and the wider development of a
multifunctional European Model of Agriculture.  Against such a background,
neat compartmentalisation of legal concepts may prove increasingly elusive, as
is openly reflected in the relevant European Community legislation.  Thus, the
2003 Horizontal Regulation is enacted under the Agriculture Title (Title II), as
opposed to the Environment Title (Title XIX), of the EC Treaty; but Article 6
of the EC Treaty stipulates that environmental protection requirements —
including the polluter pays principle — are to be integrated into the definition
and implementation of, inter alia, the CAP.  This has caused a distinct element
of cross-over in legislative focus.  Nonetheless, while cross compliance
measures may fall short of clear expression of the polluter pays principle, in the
words of Commissioner Fischer Boel, they will at least “do the additional job
of making an explicit link between the environmental standards which the
public expects and the support which the farmer receives.”155
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